We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The rst approach is static where a state-contingent participation constraint de nes an implicit mapping from rejected outcomes into outcomes that are individually rational. We this voluntary implementation, and show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is not voluntarily implementable. The second approach is dynamic where a mechanism is replayed if the outcome at any stage is vetoed by one of the agents. We call this stationary implementation, and show that if players discount the future in any way, then the constrained Walrasian correspondence is stationarily implementable.
Introduction
Implementation theory has been successful in characterizing the objectives that a society can implement when accounting for the incentives that individuals have to take advantage of their information. Nevertheless, the theory is open to criticism for the sometimes implausible mechanisms (i.e., game forms) that it relies on to show which objectives may be achieved. In this paper we focus on remedying a speci c, but critical, weakness of implementation theory: its use of implausible outcomes o the equilibrium path to enforce equilibrium behavior and/or to \break" undesirable equilibria (i.e., assure that undesired strategy combinations are not equilibria). The implausibility stems from the assumption that the outcome function is fully enforceable 1 , which is not the case in many applications.
One source of di culty in enforcement relates to commitment. If, for example, a mechanism is constructed to assist bargainers in reaching mutually improving agreements, then it is problematic to assume that highly ine cient outcomes will be allowed to stand. This is potentially a problem both on and o the equilibrium path, as o -equilibrium path considerations have implications for equilibrium behavior.
A second source of di culty with enforcement relates to property rights that are exogenous to a mechanism and impose state-contingent constraints on a social choice rule. In many settings individuals have inalienable rights that guarantee them some outcomes in some states of the world. Many economic models treat these rights as exogenous, and only impose them as participation constraints or individual rationality constraints. Here, we stress the importance of considering these constraints out of equilibrium as well as in equilibrium.
A third source of di culty with enforcement is related to dynamic contexts. Most implementation problems that have been studied are static. After the mechanism has reached an outcome, the world ends. In fact, most of these are more realistically viewed as being a single period of a multiperiod allocation problem. Thus, it makes sense to model explicitly the dynamics that can occur after the mechanism has tentatively reached an outcome. Is there renegotiation? Is the mechanism replayed? Is there time discounting between periods? 1 See Hurwicz (1994) for a general discussion of issues related to enforceability in mechanism design.
The framework laid out is designed to address these problems with enforcement, and variations on them, in a uni ed way, and includes the standard implementation problem as a special case.
Relation to the Literature
There has been a urry of recent research into the general question of realistic restrictions on mechanisms. 2 There are several papers that address either the issue of individual rationality, or renegotiation. Most closely related to this paper are three papers that deal with imposing individual rationality or allowing for renegotiation both in and out of equilibrium. 3 Ma, Moore and Turnbull (1988) were the rst to point out the importance of imposing an individual rationality constraint both in and out of equilibrium. They examined a principal-agent model where the usual individual rationality constraint (imposed only on the equilibrium path) was replaced by an \opt-out," where each player had the ability to decline the outcome of the mechanism and accept a status-quo outcome instead. Maskin and Moore (1987/98) examined a more general implementation problem, and changed the opting out to a possibility of renegotiation. They considered implementation where any outcome of a mechanism that suggests a Pareto dominated allocation is replaced by a Pareto e cient allocation according to an exogenous renegotiation function. 4 In Jackson and Palfrey (1998), 2 Concerning restrictions on mechanisms, one of the rst approaches was to require continuous and balanced outcome functions (e.g., Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989) ). Other have required properties that are necessary for a solution concept to always be well-de ned on various parts of the mechanism, such as the boundedness condition relating to eliminating dominated strategies, and the best response condition relating to Nash equilibrium, as examined in Jackson (1992), Jackson, Palfrey and Srivastava (1994) , and Abreu and Matsushima (1992) . More recently, simplicity requirements have been placed on the message space of the mechanism in papers by Dutta, Sen, and Vohra (1993), Saijo, Tatamitani, and Yamato (1993, 1998) , Tian (1992) and Sj ostr om (1995). 3 A more distantly related (but similarly motivated) problem in implementation theory is \credibility", or the ability of the planner to commit to o -equilibrium-path outcomes that are known to be undesirable, in order to implement desirable outcomes on the equilibrium path. Chakravorti, Corchon, and Wilkie (1992) investigate this, and Baliga, Corchon, and Sj ostr om (1995) and Baliga and Sj ostr om (1995) go further, by including the planner as a player in the mechanism.
in the context of a dynamic bargaining and matching model, we endogenized the alternative coming from the \opt-out". We considered implementation when players have the ability to opt out of the outcome suggested by the mechanism and be rematched with a new bargaining partner. We showed that although such an endogenous individual rationality constraint is compatible with e ciency within individual matches, it could be incompatible with e ciency from society's point of view accounting for the overall evolution of a market.
Here, we begin by unifying these approaches. They all have the common feature of viewing a mechanism as an intermediate institution that suggests outcomes that may subsequently be altered. This may be captured in a general form of implementation where an outcome of a mechanism is converted by a general state-contingent allocation rule { which we call a reversion function. Next, we examine voluntary implementation: where the reversion function is in the form of an individual rationality constraint, in the spirit of Ma, Moore and Turnbull (1988) , but taken to the general implementation problem. We show that the implications of such constraints may be derived in a variety of settings from voting to exchange. Finally, in the spirit of Jackson and Palfrey (1998), we examine a model where players may force the game form to be replayed, thereby endogenizing the reversion function (in this case, the alternative that individuals may be opting for). We show that without discounting, the set of implementable correspondences is severely limited, while with discounting much more positive results may be obtained, and for instance, the constrained Walrasian correspondence may be implemented.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the general framework and explains how the standard implementation model is being extended. We establish necessary and su cient conditions for voluntary implementation. The conditions are the natural extensions of monotonicity and no veto power, modi ed to incorporate the voluntary constraints. Section 3 presents examples which illustrate the e ect of voluntary constraints on the set of implementable social choice correspondences. That section also shows how into implementation. They examined \renegotiation-proof" implementation in a pairwise bargaining setting where the equilibrium was required to be immune to di erent sorts of renegotiation, and showed that the possibilities for implementation depend on the way in which renegotiation is modeled.
individual rationality constraints, renegotiation, and blocking coalitions all fall within the bounds of this framework. Section 4 looks at implementation when the voluntary constraint is modeled as a replay of the mechanism.
De nitions
There is a nite set of individuals or agents, I = f1; :::; ng, a known set of feasible outcomes, denoted A, and a set of states S, with individual states denoted by s. Voluntary Implementation and h-Nash implementability
The idea behind voluntary implementation is similar to the notion of an individual rationality constraint or a participation constraint. Individuals are permitted to veto some subset of the feasible set, which may vary across states and individuals. This idea can be illustrated in the simple example of a pure exchange economy with xed initial endowments, ! = (! 1 ; :::; ! n ). If x denotes some reallocation of !, then this reallocation is individually rational at s if and only if x i R i (s)! i for all i. Suppose the mechanism is (M; g), the players report m at s, and the reallocation speci ed by the outcome function is g(m). If Necessary condition for h-Nash implementation
For Nash implementation, it is well-known that monotonicity of the social choice correspondence is a necessary condition for Nash implementation. The intuition behind this condition is that if a 2 F(s) but a = 2 F(s), then implementability of F implies the existence of a mechanism where a is a Nash equilibrium outcome at s, but not a Nash equilibrium outcome at s 0 : Thus, considering the equilibrium strategies leading to a at s, there must exist an agent i that has a deviation (resulting in b), which must be preferred by i at s 0 , but not at s.
This condition generalizes in a straightforward way to h?implementation. We call this condition reversion-monotonicity.
A social choice correspondence, F, is reversion-monotonic relative to h if, for all s 2 S and for all a 2 F(s); there exists z 2 A such that:
1. H(z; s; h) = a, and 2. For all s 0 2 S such that H(z; s 0 ; h) = 2 F(s 0 ); there exists y 2 A and i 2 I such that H(z; s; h) R i (s) H(y; s; h) and H(y; s 0 ; h) P i (s 0 ) H(z; s 0 ; h).
The necessity of this condition follows the same reasoning as the necessity of monotonicity for Nash implementation. There are two di erences however. The rst is noted in item 1 above, where it is recognized that a may not be coming directly from the mechanism, but instead from the reversion function. The second di erence is in item 2, where it is not just the lower contour set of a that matters, but also the (state-dependent) reversion function, since this function determines what outcomes will be vetoed in each state and the resulting reversion point following a veto.
Generalized Reversion Functions
In fact, this necessary condition can be stated in a more general form, which will prove useful in the dynamic context as well. The approach outlined above with a reversion function presumes that any single agent can veto an outcome and then the alternative that replaces it is independent of the starting alternative. Instead, we can consider the situation where any suggested alternative a is converted in a state dependent way via some mapping G.
Consider any mapping G : A S ! A. The H de ned above for a given h is one such function.
We say that m is an G-Nash equilibrium of (M; g) at s if Similarly, su cient conditions for Nash implementation have analogs for G-Nash implmentation.
With Nash implementation, it is well-known that if there are at least 3 players, monotonic social choice correspondences are Nash implementable if they satisfy No Veto Power. No veto power states that if all players except possibly one agree on a best outcome in some state, then that outcome must be in the social choice correspondence at that state. A similar result follows here for G-Nash implementation, using an appropriately modi ed version of NVP.
A social choice correspondence F satis es G-No Veto Power (G-NVP) if, for all i 2 I, z 2 A, and s 2 S, G(z; s) 2 F(s) whenever G(z; s)R j (s)G(y; s) for all y 2 A. Theorem 2 If n 3 and F is G-monotonic and satis es G?NV P; then F is G-implementable.
Again, the proof is an easy extension of proofs of Nash implementability, and is provided in an appendix.
Applications Implementation with Individual Rationality Constraints
One of the most natural applications of h-implementation is to problems in which there is a xed status quo outcome that any agent can revert to. For example, in the case of exchange economies, it is often natural to assume that each individual can protect their initial endowment. Surprisingly, applications of implementation theory to exchange environments generally ignore these constraints. This is not to claim that implementation theory has not investigated whether certain individually rational social choice functions are implementable. That is a much di erent issue. The issue is that individual rationality constraints must be respected for the entire outcome function, rather than just at the equilibrium outcome. Why? If the individual messages happen to produce an outcome that violates individual rationality constraints, then a violated agent can simply veto the outcome. We are requiring that the mechanism be voluntary: no agent can be forced to accept an outcome. In this way the mechanism may be viewed as the protocol for communication between agents, after which all of their signatures are required before a suggested outcome becomes nal.
As we will see below, the constraint that outcomes be acceptable to all agents can either restrict or even expand the set of allocation rules that are implementable. The intuition for why the set of implementable social choice functions can be restricted by such constraints is obvious. The intuition for why the set of implementable social choice functions can expand is more subtle, and has to do with the fact that these constraints implicitly provide statecontingent threat points that can a ect equilibrium behavior.
The simplest reversion function is simply a xed status quo outcome, w, which results if any individual vetoes g(m). That is, h(s) = w for all s and H(a; s; h) = a if aR i (s)w for all i = w if wP i (s)a for some i:
We call h-implementation with this kind of reversion function IR-implementation.
The following examples illustrate how IR-monotonicity can di er from monotonicity. The rst example illustrates this surprising phenomenon that a social choice correspondence may satisfy IR-monotonicity, but fail to be monotonic.
Example 1 (Voting)
Let A = fw; x; y; zg; I = f1; 2; 3g, and S = fs; s 0 g: The status quo outcome is w (regardless of the state). Preferences are described below, where higher outcomes in the table are preferred to lower outcomes. x y z x y z z z x z z x y x y y x w w w w w w y w Let F(s) = fx; zg and F(s 0 ) = fxg. F is not monotonic, since z 2 F(s), z = 2 F(s 0 ), but the only preference reversal between s and s 0 involves agent 3's preferences changing between outcomes y and w. However, F satis es IR-monotonicity. To see this, not e that H(y; s 0 ; h) = y, but H(y; s; h) = w: Thus, for player 2 it is the case that H(z; s; h)R 2 (s)H(y; s; h) and H(y; s 0 ; h)P 2 (s 0 )H(z; s 0 ; h), since these two relations reduce to zR 2 (s)w and yP 2 (s 0 )z; respectively.
To understand this phenomenon, note that the revision function introduces a form of sequential rationality to the Nash implementation problem.
The same phenomenon can be seen in an exchange economy. This f does not satisfy monotonicity, since the lower contour sets relative to x CD expand for both players, implying that x CD must be an equililibrium outcome at s 0 under any mechanism for which it is an equilibrium outcome at s. However, under individual rationality considerations this implication is no longer true. Consider the trivial mechanism where player 2 simply chooses between x CD and x L . In state s, x CD is individually rational, but x L is not individually rational for player 1, so this choice reduces to a choice between x CD and w. Since player 2 prefers x CD ro w, his optimal choice is x CD . In state s 0 , both x CD and x L are individually rational for both players. Since player 2 prefers x L to x CD , his optimal choice is x L . Thus, this simple mechanism voluntarily implements the stated allocation rule, which is not Nash implementable.
Both examples 1 and 2 show that there are voluntarily implementable social choice correspondences that are not Nash implementable. The next example shows the converse. 5 A similar example appears in Moore and Repullo (1988) , to illustrate how non-monotonic social choice functions can be implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium. This social choice function is monotonic and implementable by the simply mechanism where player 2 chooses between x and y. However, this is not individually rational in state s 0 , and hence not voluntarily implementable. In particular, individual rationality requires F(s 0 ) = fwg.
Next we show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is an important social choice correspondence that falls into the category of being Nash implementable, but failing to be voluntarily implementable.
Example 4 (Non-Implementability of the Constrained Walrasian Correspondence)
Consider a two-person two-good exchange economy, with initial endowment point w:
There are two states, which determine two possible preference pro les, as illustrated in gure 2 below. FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE Here, the unique Walrasian outcome at s is not a Walrasian equilibrium at s 0 . However, the only changes in preferences with a, occur at points that are not individually rational for agent 2. Thus, a must still be an equilibrium outcome at s 0 even though it is not a Walrasian outcome. Since these are interior points, this applies to the constrained Walrasian correspondence. 6 The next example shows that the implications of voluntary implementation extend far beyond the consideration of Nash implementation. There are also implications for other forms of implementation.
Example 5 (Not Voluntarily Implementable via any Solution, but Implementable via Many)
This is an example of an allocation rule that is individually rational, and is implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium, undominated Nash equilibrium, iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and is virtually implementable. However, it is not implementable by any solution concept if agents can veto outcomes that are not individually This social choice function violates IR-monotonicity, since the utility functions only di er on allocations that will revert to w in any mechanism that speci es them in the outcome function.
In constrast, it is easy to show that these allocation rules are implementable via subgame perfect equilibrium, undominated Nash equilibrium, iterated weak dominance, perfect equilibrium, and is also virtually implementable. For example, the following mechanism implements f via iterated weak dominance, where y and z are the allocations marked in gure 6 See Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995) for a detailed discussion of the constrained Walrasian correspondence and its Nash implementability. 13 . Similar mechanisms can be constructed for implementation by other re nements.
The insight from this example is that the voluntary constraint implies that individuals' preference relations over outcomes that are not individually rational (for some individual) are irrelevant. Re nements have been used in implementation theory to take advantage of any reversal in preferences, even when these involve alternatives that are sub-optimal or not individually rational. This is not possible in voluntary implementation, regardless of the solution concept used.
Implementation with Renegotiation
Maskin and Moore 1987/98] consider a di erent version of a reversion function, which also ts nicely within the present framework. They are concerned with the renegotiation problem that can arise in mechanism design. In particular, they argue that if g(m) is ine cient in state s, then the players will renegotiate the outcome to something that is Pareto e cient, and which Pareto dominates it. Since the second property (Pareto domination of g(m)) will generally depend on g(m) itself, they de ne a reversion function that depends not only on the state but also on the the allocation that is vetoed. In particular, they de ne a renegotiation function r : A S ! A. Given that r is Pareto e cient, there will always be some voter who would veto g(m) if it were ine cient at stage s. Therefore, implementation with renegotiation is consistent with our \veto" interpretation of the h function, and is an example of a G function.
Implementation with Coalitional Veto Sets
The notion of h-implementation can be generalized substantially, within the framework of the G-function. First, as with implementation with renegotiation, one can allow h to depend on the outcome that is being vetoed. Second, and perhaps more interesting, one can allow for coalitional veto sets. For example, one can require majority rule approval of the outcome of the mechanism, with the outcome reverting to h(s) if g(m) is does not receive a majority. The generalization of this is the concept of blocking coalitions. In our de nition of \voluntary" implementation, each individual constitutes a blocking coalition. In many contexts, one can argue that this is too strong a requirement, and that larger coalitions may be needed to veto an outcome. 
Voluntary Implementation with Repeated Mechanisms
In this section, we endogenize the generalized reversion function, by considering situations where a player opting out of an outcome simply forces the mechanism to be replayed. The motivation for examining this situation is simple, and related to the motivation for studying implementation with renegotiation. If an individual vetoes g(m), it is unnatural to suppose that the world stops at that moment. For example, in a pure exchange environment, if an agent vetoes g(m), and the endowment results, the individuals in the economy could simply play the mechanism again. 7 This is precisely how game theorists have modeled bargaining. When two agents bargain, say by o ers and countero ers, rejection of an o er generally does not mean no-trade (except in very special cases like the ultimatum game). The reason for this is that the notion of voluntary trade implies that if there are still gains to trade to be exploited, the agents involved will continue playing some game. In this section, we explore a general model of recontracting of this sort, when rejection (i.e. veto) of g(m) is followed by simply replaying the mechanism again in the following period. This converts the original mechanism into an in nite game form.
For this reason, we time date outcomes, so the outcome space is expanded to be A = A f1; 2; 3:::g and a typical outcome is denoted a t . For simplicity we write drop the subscript in the rst period and write a 1 = a. In the event that players use strategies such that no outcome is ever reached, the outcome of the game is denoted ;. We assume that y t P i (s); for all i; y; s; and t.
Stationary Preferences, Equilibrium, and Implementation
Preferences are extended to be complete and transitive on A f1; 2; 3:::g for all players.
The following assumptions on extended preferences over time dated outcomes, capture a stationarity of preferences. The above assumptions are maintained throughout this section. The rst two restrictions on preferences guarantee that individuals' tastes do not change over time, and are thus time consistent. The third restriction avoids the pathological case of 7 More generally, a veto might trigger an alternative mechanism which is played. We looked at voluntary implementation using sequential mechanisms in a matching/bargaining framework in Jackson-Palfrey (1998). That is, a message pro le is a stationary equilibrium if the players are best responding given that players realize a veto today results in the same message pro le being played tomorrow. 9 A social choice function is attainable in stationary equilibrium via a mechanism (M; g) if, for each s, there exists a stationary equilibrium m s such that g(m s ) = f(s):
Attainability is a very weak form of implementation (essentially, an indirect version of truthful implementation).
A social choice correspondence F is implementable in stationary equilibrium if there exists a mechanism, (M; g) such that, for all s : Before taking a careful look at stationary implementation, we rst apply Theorems 1 and 2 to characterize stationary implementation. Given individuals' weak preference against delay, the de nition of G-monotonicity translates to: 8 Note that here the last argument of H is an outcome rather than a social choice function. This obvious extension can be made formal by considering the constant social choice function resulting in g(m)2.
A social choice correspondence F satis es stationary monotonicity if, for all s, s 0 , and x 2 F(s) such that x = 2 F(s 0 ) there exists y 2 A and i 2 I such that for all t, x t R i (s) H(y t ; s; x t+1 ) and H(y t ; s 0 ; x t+1 ) P i (s 0 ) x t .
Theorem 3 If a social choice correspondence is implementable in stationary equilibrium then it satis es stationary monotonicity.
Proof: This follows from Theorem 1.
Within this abstract framework, we can also obtain a standard characterization of sufciency for the case of 3 or more agents. If a social choice function satis es stationary monotonicity and dynamic NVP, then it is implementable in stationary Nash equilibrium.
The modi cation of NV P to the dynamic case is straightforward.
A social choice correspondence F satis es stationary No Veto Power if z 2 F(s) for all z and s such that there exists some i such that, for all j 6 = i, for all y 2 A and for all t: 
Stationary Implementation with No Discounting
Let us consider the case with no discounting. That is the case where a t I i (s) a, for all i, a, s, and t = 1; 2; :::. Therefore, the time subscripts in the de nition of stationary equilibrium can be removed, and the problem becomes very straightforward.
In this case, we call f self-attainable if it is attainable in stationary equilibrium.
This immediately produces the following su cient condition for self-attainability.
Proposition 1 Suppose that, for all s, if x is Pareto e cient at s and y 6 = x, then there exists some agent, i such that xP i (s)y: If f is Pareto e cient, then f is self-attainable.
Proof: Consider the mechanism in which each player simultaneously announces an outcome, so M i = A. If all announcements match, say m i = x for all i, then let g(m) = x. If the announcements don't all match, then let g(m) = x 0 , where x 0 is some pre-speci ed default outcome. Consider s and x = f(s). Note that x is Pareto e cient at s. We need only show that m i = x for all i and t forms a stationary equilibrium at s. At s, given that individuals play m at each date in the future outcome that will not get vetoed is x. To see this, consider some other outcome, y 6 = x: By the supposition on preferences, there exists some player i for whom xP i (s)y, and so H(y; s; x 2 ) = x 2 . Thus, m is a stationary equilibrium.
Notice that the assumption in the proposition is reasonably weak. If there are never two Pareto e cient outcomes that every player is indi erent between, then the assumption is satis ed.
Next, we turn to the stronger notion of implementation in stationary equilibrium, which we simply call fully self-implementable in the no discounting case. For the case where agents all have strict preferences over the Pareto set in any state, the Pareto Correspondence is self implementable. Consider a mechanism such that for every pro le of actions of the other agents, each agent has an action which can lead to any outcome. (Such a mechanism exists, as evidenced by a modulo construction.) It is easily seen that any such mechanism fully self-implements the Pareto correspondence. Propositions 1 and 2 are fairly negative, in that they say that self-implementation and self-attainability do not allow for much discretion. Note that these propositions are consistent with what we know from the bargaining literature (e.g., Rubinstein (1982) ). If individuals do not discount the future, then any bargaining split can be an equilibrium. What we have shown above is that this is robust across settings and mechanisms. Regardless of the mechanism or outcome space, any Pareto e cient outcome is attainable in stationary equilibrium, and any implementable correspondence must contain the Pareto correspondence.
We also know from the bargaining literature, that the introducing a strict preference against delay changes the scope of equilibrium. That turns out to be true in the dynamic implementation problem as well, as we now explore.
Stationary Implementation with Discounting
In most settings, it is more reasonable to expect that rejection of the outcome of a mechanism will lead to delay in the implementation of a nal outcome, and that individuals nd this delay costly.
The discounting case is formalized by requiring that aP i (s)a t , for all i, a, s, and t > 1. For the discussion of the discounting case we assume that A is a metric space, with metric j j.
To begin to understand stationary implementation with discounting, we study a useful strengthening of stationary monotonicity. This strong form of monotonicity is applicable in many settings, including exchange economies.
A social choice correspondence F satis es local monotonicity if, for all s, s 0 , and x 2 F(s) such that x = 2 F(s 0 ), and for all ", there exists y 2 A and i 2 I with jy ? f(s)j < " such that x R i (s) y and y P i (s 0 ) x.
Local monotonicity is a strengthening of monotonicity in that it requires that the test alternative y can be picked to be arbitrarily close to x. If preferences are continuous then y can be chosen so that it is prefered to receiving f(s) with one-period delay. This leads to the following Theorem.
Theorem 5 If preferences are continuous and individuals discount the future, then for each i and s, then if F satis es local monotonicity it also satis es stationary monotonicity. Proof: Consider s, s 0 and x 2 F(s) such that x = 2 F(s 0 ). By the continuity of preferences and discounting, there exists " such that zP j (s 0 )x 2 for all j and z such that jz ? xj < ". Apply local monotonicity with this ", to nd i and y with the properties stated in the de nition of local monotonicity. By our choice of " it follows that x t R i (s)H(y t ; s; x t+1 ) and H(y t ; s 0 ; x t+1 ) = y t P i (s 0 )x t+1 . Thus, stationary monotonicity is satis ed.
We now illustrate the power of Theorem 5, by applying it to pure exchange environments to show that the constrained Walrasian social choice function can be implemented in stationary equilibria.
Let`denote the number of goods and e i 2 IR+ denote the endowment of agent i, where The constraint in the de nition above appears in the restriction to y 2 A which implies that i's demand of any good is limited by the total available endowment in the economy.
Theorem 6 With time discounting preferences, if n 3, then the constrained Walrasian correspondence is implementable in stationary equilibrium.
Proof: We need only show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence satis es local monotonicity. Theorem 6 then follows from Theorems 5 and 4. 10 Consider x that is a 10 It is straightforward to check that stationary NVP is satis ed in an exchange economy with continuous and locally non-satiated preferences and time discounting.
constrained Walrasian equilibrium at s, with corresponding price p, but not at s 0 . It follows that x is not the (constrained) demand of some agent i at s 0 . By the continuity, convexity, and increasingness of preferences it follows that for any ", there exists y 2 A such that p y i p x i and jy ? xj < " and y i P i (s 0 )x i . Local monotonicity is thus satis ed.
It is essential to Theorem 6 that the set of alternatives not be discrete. The ability to nd trade-o s locally is critical to the theorem. This is analagous to the results in bargaining. For instance, in Rubinstein bargaining, if only discrete o ers can be made, then if agents do not discount too much, then all splits are sustainable in (stationary) equilibrium. Here, similar results hold: the results of the no-discounting case carry over if the set of alternatives is discrete and players are su ciently patient.
